Australia, long condemned to the ´tyranny of distance´, now faces the ´peril of proximity´. This is because of increasing uncertainty about the stability of Asian security. As a democratic free-trading middle power, Australia’s main concern is the preservation of the globalised international order. Australian policy makers, however, are unsure of the right course in Asia, whether to focus on developing multilateral institutions or to bolster links with like-minded countries such as India, Japan and the United States. As a result, Canberra is likely to be reactive and supportive of others’ initiatives in Asia, rather than revitalise its past role as a ‘norm entrepreneur’.
The Atlantic Basin receives less attention from international relations experts than other maritime spaces around the world, such as the Mediterranean Sea, the Arctic Circle, the Indian Ocean or the Asia-Pacific. This is probably, at least in part, because this enormous geopolitical area – including countries from North America, Central America, Europe as well as littoral countries in South America and Africa - is very eclectic. However, the vast majority of the countries that form the Atlantic basin are democracies, and collectively they account for the majority of global trade and foreign investment as well as a very large and growing proportion of energy resources. In addition, the absence of entrenched rivalry among the main powers of the Atlantic Basin is notable compared to the hardening geopolitics of other regions.
'Strategic patience' is the core guiding principle in the new National Security Strategy of the United States. The document seeks to outline a prudent middle course between the world as it is and the world the US seeks. However, while offering important pointers for the American global posture, the new strategy also exposes the strategic dilemmas facing the US.
Emerging powers play an increasingly central role in international development. Recognising this, the EU is seeking to strengthen discussion and collaboration on development with these powers through its strategic partnerships. However, the scope for such engagement varies widely, depending on each country’s goals and strategies in relation to both development cooperation and the multilateral development agenda. In this book, leading experts examine the approach to development adopted by Brazil, China, India, Korea and South Africa; the status of current EU engagement with these strategic partners on development; and opportunities to strengthen this engagement. The book is part of the broader FRIDE-Egmont Institute ESPO initiative that provides analysis on the EU’s relations with its strategic partners.
Since it joined the OECD-DAC, Korea has become an increasingly important development actor. Korea is keen to develop partnerships with traditional donors and has already done so with a number of European member states. Given the relevance of Korea’s remarkable development experience, not least with a view to bridging Northern and Southern agendas, as well as the synergies between Korean and European development priorities, greater EU-Korean cooperation on development could prove particularly fruitful.
Although development has featured in the EU-India strategic partnership dialogue, India has little incentive or interest to collaborate with the EU in this area. India’s approach to development and its credibility with developing country partners is based on its ‘Southern’ identity. The EU must therefore be realistic about the limited possibilities for collaboration with India, while continuing to seek local opportunities for cooperation – such as in Afghanistan – and exploring the potential convergence of development approaches between some EU member states and India.